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ABSTRACT
Courts have long struggled with how to balance false association claims brought under the Lanham
Act with the protections for speech under the First Amendment. The leading approach is the Rogers
test, but this test comes in multiple forms with varying degrees of protection for speech. A substantial
portion of the litigation raising this issue now involves video games, a medium that more so than
others, likely needs the benefit of a clear rule that protects speech. The original version of the test is
the simplest and the one most protective of speech. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the original
version of the Rogers test in unusually clear terms, yet in the face of conflicting decisions from the
court of appeals, the district courts may still mistake the Ninth Circuit’s meaning. The Ninth Circuit
may soon have the opportunity to clarify its meaning yet again. This article suggests the court does
so, making clear that the original Rogers approach is indeed the law of at least the Ninth Circuit.
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RESTORING ROGERS: VIDEO GAMES, FALSE ASSOCIATION CLAIMS, AND
THE “EXPLICITLY MISLEADING” USE OF TRADEMARKS
WILLIAM K. FORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like a classic arcade game, Rogers v. Grimaldi1 has three lives. In the leading
treatise on trademark law, J. Thomas McCarthy describes the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rogers as “immensely influential”
and “very popular with other courts.”2 The case offers a test for balancing Lanham Act
claims with the First Amendment. “The Rogers test,” as one district court judge
explained, “is relatively straightforward to apply, and is very protective of speech.”3
Yet courts that claim to follow Rogers often do not, at least not as the test was originally
explained. In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit described the Rogers test in a way
that is less straightforward to apply and less protective of speech, 4 resulting in a second
version of the Rogers test. The Ninth Circuit has also been inconsistent. It adopted
the original Rogers test in 2002,5 but several years later in E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v.
Rock Star Videos, Inc,6 a case that foreshadowed a flurry of video game litigation
involving this issue, the Ninth Circuit arguably adopted a third version of the test, the
least protective of the three. Two district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit, both
involving video games and decided after E.S.S., illustrate the confusion: Electronic
Arts, Inc. v. Textron, Inc. applied this third version of Rogers,7 whereas Novalogic
applied the original version.8 Textron represents a low point for creative freedom in
the video game industry, but the Ninth Circuit subsequently endorsed the original
Rogers test in no uncertain terms in 2013,9 suggesting that Textron was wrong and
Novalogic was right.
Currently, there is an appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit that reopens the
Textron question. Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC 10
centers around the unauthorized use of Virag’s trademark in two racing video games.

* Associate Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. Thanks to
Shannon Ford, Raizel Liebler, and Cristina Zambrana for comments on earlier drafts.
1 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
2 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 31:144.50 (4th ed. 2017).
3 Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, 41 F. Supp. 3d 885, 900 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
4 See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 493-95 (2d Cir.
1989); Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Louis
Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
5 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We agree with the Second
Circuit’s analysis and adopt the Rogers standard as our own.”).
6 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
7 See Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., No. 12-0118, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103914, at *11-13 (N.D.
Cal. July 25, 2012).
8 Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 898-900.
9 See Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1241- 47 (9th Cir. 2013).
10 No. 15-1729, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111211 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
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The district court sided with the video game defendants on the Lanham Act claims, 11
but the court suggested that Textron might still have some viability as a persuasive
application of the Rogers test.12 The plaintiffs are now pressing Textron on appeal
before the Ninth Circuit.13 The Ninth Circuit, at some point, will have to revisit Rogers
and end the doubt about how the test will work in the Ninth Circuit, particularly in
the context of video games.14 Virag is a suitable case both for the needed reaffirmation
of Rogers in its original form and for dealing with Textron. Absent a settlement that
ends the appeal, Virag should therefore be a particularly important case for the video
game industry. Of course, Virag can only settle the question in the Ninth Circuit.
Intervention from the U.S. Supreme Court is needed to settle the question nationally.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND VIDEO GAMES
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association held that video games, like other forms of media, are entitled to First
Amendment protection.15 Like newspapers, magazines, books, and films, video games
are, at least in general, expressive, non-commercial speech.16 Few would doubt that
11 The court also dismissed a claim that the use of the mark violated Virag the corporation’s right
of publicity on the ground that corporations do not have a right of publicity. Id. at *13-20. The court
did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants violated Virag co-owner and race car driver
Mirco Virag’s right of publicity. Id. at *20-24. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that claim,
however, allowing an appeal to go forward. Br. of Appellant at 3, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t
Am. LLC, No. 16-15137 (9th Cir. June 2, 2016); Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, Virag, S.R.L. v.
Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 15-1729 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016).
12 Id. at *39-40.
13 Br. of Appellant at 55-60, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 16-15137 (9th
Cir. June 2, 2016); Reply Br. of Appellant at 26, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No.
16-15137 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2016).
14 The confusion addressed in the present discussion is not the only confusion the Ninth Circuit
has created in the application of Rogers. District courts in the Ninth Circuit have also disagreed over
whether the Rogers test applies only to culturally significant marks. Compare Rebelution, LLC v.
Perez, 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The Ninth Circuit has adopted the Rogers test,
however, it has placed an important threshold limitation upon its application: plaintiff’s mark must
be of such cultural significance that it has become an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.”), with
Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Group, LLC, No. 10-2982, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155444, at
*10-11 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (“Expressive speech containing references to cultural icons with broad
public recognition does not enjoy any greater First Amendment protection than expressive speech
making only obscure references. Thus, there is no basis for applying the Rogers test only when the
expressive or artistic speech makes reference to culturally significant marks.”). The district court in
Virag rejected the argument that the Rogers test applies only to culturally significant marks. Virag,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111211, at *28-30. Requiring cultural significance as a threshold requirement
for the application of the Rogers test now appears to be the minority view among the district courts.
See Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distrib., 161 F. Supp. 3d 902, 906-07 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
15 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
16 Litigants, much like law students in class, often argue that because expressive works are sold
for profit, these works must constitute commercial speech, but courts, like professors, keep explaining
this is not how courts define commercial speech for First Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Argello v.
City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The City [of Lincoln, Nebraska] contends that
the ordinance [restricting fortunetelling] can be upheld as a regulation of commercial speech. It reads
the ordinance as limited to fortunetelling for pay. The ordinance is not so limited on its face, nor has
any court of Nebraska given it such a limiting construction. Even if it were so limited, we do not
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newspapers must be free to report and comment upon people, products, and businesses
by name without the need to ask for permission. A need for permission would deter
critical coverage, and critical coverage provides valuable information to the public.
Even the National Football League would not pressure newspaper reporters to refer to
the Super Bowl as “the big game” in sports stories.17 When it comes to fiction—and
fiction, not hard news, dominates the video game medium—it may not be as obvious
that the free use of names, likenesses, and trademarks outweighs the interests of realworld people and real-world trademark owners to control when and how they or their
marks appear in the media. Nevertheless, courts do recognize that there are
significant First Amendment interests in entertainment and fiction, 18 and they also
recognize First Amendment interests in using real-world people and trademarks in
expressive, non-commercial speech, whether fiction, non-fiction, or something inbetween.19 There are limits, however, and even when the limits are not exceeded, the
unlicensed use of names or trademarks in various expressive works, including video
games, can result in false association claims brought under the Lanham Act, as well
as state law claims, such as infringement of the right of publicity.

believe this proscription would fall into the commercial-speech category. The speech itself,
fortunetelling, is not commercial simply because someone pays for it. The speech covered by the
ordinance, for the most part, does not simply propose a commercial transaction. Rather, it is the
transaction. The speech itself is what the ‘client’ is paying for.”) (emphasis in original); Int’l
Brominated Solvents Ass’n v. Am. Conf. of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Inc., No. 04-0394,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27605, at *18 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2004) (“Plaintiffs assert that, because
[defendant’s] manuals are sold for profit, the act of publishing the [manual] is commercial speech and,
therefore, not entitled to the constitutional protection afforded by the prior restraint doctrine. This
argument mischaracterizes the types of speech regarded as commercial for purposes of the First
Amendment.”). For First Amendment purposes, commercial speech is often defined as speech that
“does no more than propose a commercial transaction,” such as a traditional advertisement, but
commercial speech probably includes somewhat more than the quoted phrase literally suggests. See
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014) (discussing the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech); Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 515-17 (7th Cir. 2014) (same);
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1016-18 (3d Cir. 2008) (same).
17 See Terry Tang, Businesses Stay Clear of Using Super Bowl Name, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
30, 2015 (“It is the game that must not be named—at least not without permission.”). The author of
the article, perhaps based on her communications with an NFL spokesperson, added that news
organizations can use the term because “a fair use exception allows for news organizations to use the
Super Bowl moniker.” Id. The author did not mention whether such uses would even be likely to
cause consumer confusion nor did she mention the role of the First Amendment.
18 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“We do not accede to appellee’s suggestion
that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.
Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement,
teaches another’s doctrine.”).
19 See, e.g., Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997 (“Movies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works
of artistic expression and deserve protection . . . Though First Amendment concerns do not insulate
titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims, such concerns must nonetheless inform our
consideration of the scope of the Act as applied to claims involving such titles.”). As a related example
involving the use of a person’s identity and the right of publicity, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (“[U]se ‘for purposes of trade’ does not ordinarily include the use of a person’s
identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in
advertising that is incidental to such uses.”).
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Just as the reconciliation of the right of publicity with the First Amendment is
“all over the map,”20 so too is the reconciliation of the Lanham Act with the First
Amendment. In Lanham Act cases, however, the disagreement among the courts is
less obvious because most courts claim to follow the same test, the Rogers test. Plus,
the outcomes of cases actually litigated to a judicial decision tend to be consistent. But
Rogers comes in three versions, which I’ll refer to as Rogers I, Rogers II, and Rogers
III. Each purport to offer First Amendment protection to media defendants from
Lanham Act claims, but as will be discussed in more detail below, they are not equal.
Rogers I offers the most First Amendment protection, Rogers II offers less, and Rogers
III offers no special protection at all. Perhaps this inconsistency partially explains why
lawsuits continue despite the often similar outcomes.
Why focus on video games in a discussion of this issue? In part, it’s because video
game cases make up a significant portion of the recent cases in the Rogers line,
particularly in the Ninth Circuit. There is also good reason to worry that video games
are still treated differently by courts than other, more traditional forms of media. The
cases involving the right of publicity suggest as much, even after the Supreme Court’s
decision in 2011.21 A comment from the bench during the oral argument in Davis v.
Electronic Arts, Inc. (September 2014) is suggestive of the lack of familiarity with the
gaming medium that video game producers can face in dealing with government
decision-makers.22 Davis involved claims by retired NFL players that Electronic Arts
(“EA”) violated their rights of publicity by using their identities in the Madden NFL
games.23 The following exchange between Judge Marsha Berzon and EA’s attorney
Alonzo Wickers was prompted by Wickers’ suggestion that right of publicity cases
involving greetings cards and t-shirts are distinguishable from cases involving video
games or other expressive works.
BERZON: In other words, the video game is more of an expressive work than
a greeting card or a t-shirt?
WICKERS: A video game is per se an expressive work, your honor.
BERZON: What does that mean, per se?

20 Br. of 31 Constitutional Law Professors and Intellectual Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Electronic Arts v. Davis, No. 15-424 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016).
21 See generally William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the
Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH L.J. 1 (2013). See also DAVID S.
WELKOWITZ & TYLER T. OCHOA, CELEBRITY RIGHTS: RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND RELATED RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 386 (2010) (“[A]s a practical matter, traditional media get more
respect when the First Amendment implications of their works are assessed.”).
22 This lack of familiarity can be found in other contexts as well, such as state legislatures trying
to restrict minors’ access to violent video games. See William K. Ford, The Law and Science of Video
Game Violence: Who Lost More in Translation?, in TRANSLATING THE SOCIAL WORLD FOR LAW, at 107,
126-129 (Elizabeth Mertz, William K. Ford, & Gregory M. Matoesian eds., 2016).
23 See Davis v. Electronic Arts, 775 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1448 (2016).
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WICKERS: You can have a t-shirt, for example—the one I’m wearing under
my shirt today, your honor, has no content on it, no expression. It’s not an
expressive work. The court, however—
BERZON: How about a greeting card?
WICKERS: A greeting card can be—you can have a plain greeting card that
has no message on it.
BERZON: Well, I know, but 99% of greeting cards, it seems to me, have
pictures and they have writing and they’re at least as expressive as a video
game, probably more so.24
Regardless of whether greetings cards are properly labeled per se expressive works,
the suggestion that video games fall somewhere below greeting cards on even a vague
measure of expressive content is striking.
As a medium for images and text, greeting cards could be as original, memorable,
profound, and timeless as any other type of expressive work. But whatever the
theoretical possibilities, the greeting card medium has mostly failed to rise beyond the
ephemeral. A notable image, passage of text, or character may end up on a greeting
card, but such things rarely originate on one.25 The lasting value of any particular
card almost certainly lies with the identity of the giver, the comments he or she adds
to the card, and/or the circumstances under which it is given, but not with the original
work of the greeting card artist and/or writer. While Judge Berzon’s comparison
between greeting cards and video games may have been a sort of softball comment not
really reflective of her views,26 it more likely reflects a dismissive view of the medium.27

24 Oral Argument at 00:09:33, Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 12-15737 (9th Cir. Sept. 11,
2014) (emphasis added), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hlz3cx6IWQ. Some minor
verbal stumbles (or disfluencies) are omitted.
25 Exceptions are hard to come by. One example where a creative work originated on a greeting
card and then achieved some cultural impact and enduring recognition is Hallmark’s elderly
curmudgeon character Maxine (and her dog Floyd). Maxine was created by John Wagner in 1986 and
then appeared on greeting cards, T-shirts, coffee mugs, and ornaments, and in calendars and books
from the 1980s to the present. See PATRICK REGAN, HALLMARK: A CENTURY OF CARING 232-33 (2009).
Perhaps a second example is the cat and rabbit duo Hoops and Yoyo, who appear on greetings cards,
television specials, and elsewhere, but they first appeared on e-cards, so maybe the example is slightly
off. See Ben Paynter, Creating: Mike Adair and Bob Holt, Greeting Card Artists: Two Guys, a Cat and
a Funny Green Bunny, WALL ST. JOURNAL, May 12, 2012, at C11. One practical limitation on
individual greeting cards achieving greater notice is that, unlike books, films, poems, and paintings,
they lack clear titles. Based on my discussion with the workers at a local Hallmark store, a particular
Maxine card I purchased is designated, at least for their purposes, as only MXN 111-4, not by a title.
On the Hallmark.com website it’s designated, “Inside This Card Funny Birthday Card.”
26 See, e.g., Rachel Clark Hughey, Effective Appellate Advocacy before the Federal Circuit: A
Former Law Clerk’s Perspective, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 401, 435-36 (2010) (“Sometimes one of
the judges will throw a softball question—one that actually helps your case. Too many attorneys
assume all questions are bad and immediately react that way.”).
27 See Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 43-46 (2013).
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As is often pointed out, the gaming medium may still lack its Citizen Kane,28 but it has
gone well beyond producing only the disposable and forgettable. 29
Unfortunately, scholars have not documented, at least in in any systematic way,
the extent to which clearance practices in the trademark area vary across different
forms of media, but it’s likely that video game producers operate with less creative
freedom than producers in mediums like film and television, to say nothing of books
and newspapers. Consider this statement about the rights of filmmakers to show
trademarks in their works in a leading book on clearance practices in the film and
television industry:
A filmmaker’s right to include trademarks within a film is clear. You have a
right to include them in your film as long as the trademark or product bearing
the trademark is used as it was intended to be used without any consequences
of its use being abnormal or out of the ordinary.30
The qualification in the second sentence is due to worries about how a trademark
owner or a court might react when a product is misused, which is perhaps an
overstated concern with regard to a court,31 but contrast this relative freedom to show
a trademark with a similar book on video games:
28 See Helen Lewis, Here Comes the Angry Birds Film, but Why Can’t a Game Just Be a Game?,
THE OBSERVER (London), May 8, 2016 (“Films get taken seriously by ‘serious people’, and so the
question ‘what is the Citizen Kane of video games?’ has long since become a cliché among games
journalists.”); Citizen Kane (RKO 1941).
29 See, e.g., Ford & Liebler, supra note 21, at 67-72.
30 MICHAEL C. DONALDSON & LISA A. CALLIF, CLEARANCE & COPYRIGHT 312 (4th ed. 2014).
31 Due to a lack of actual cases involving films—but see Films of Distinction v. Allegro Film
Prods., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081-82 (C.D. Cal. 1998)—the authors offer two hypothetical examples of
trade libel, but neither of them is compelling. See DONALDSON & CALLIF, supra note 30, at 312-13.
Generally speaking, trade libel requires a false statement of fact. See Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728
F.3d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 2013); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 27:109 (4th ed. 2017); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 623A, 626 (1977). See
generally Michael A. Albert & Robert L. Bocchino Jr., Trade Libel: Theory and Practice Under the
Common Law, The Lanham Act, and the First Amendment, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 826 (1999).
Consistent with the point, Donaldson & Callif define trade libel as follows: “Trade libel occurs when
a product or service is falsely accused of some bad attribute.” DONALDSON & CALLIF, supra note 30,
at 312. Their examples lack this element of falsity, however. Indeed, they seem to drop the falsity
requirement by the end of the discussion. Their first example is depicting someone in a film dying
from a poisoned Coca-Cola or McDonald’s hamburger. They say this would be an example of trade
libel. Id. But why would this be true if the poisoning is clearly a fictional plot device rather than a
claim about these products in the real world? The other example is based on Anheuser-Busch’s realworld objection to certain scenes in Flight (Paramount Pictures 2012), a film in which a substanceabusing pilot drinks recognizable brands of alcohol while driving and flying, including Budweiser. Id.
at 313. They note Anheuser-Busch never sued. Why? “Surely they knew they would not win,” they
say. Id. Why is that? Donaldson and Callif don’t provide a clear answer, but presumably, it’s that
there was no false statement of fact. Yet they still add this “stipulation” to the creative freedom of
filmmakers in their conclusion: “courts side with the creative community when it comes to featuring
real products in movies and television shows, as the real products were meant to be used.” Id. (emphasis
added). If this was true, then the Flight example would be a winner for Anheuser-Busch, not a loser.
After all, Budweiser and other alcoholic products are not meant to be used while driving a car or
piloting a plane. See, e.g., 14 CFR 91.17(a) (2017).
Donaldson and Callif seem to be blurring trade libel and dilution. Earlier versions of the book
contained this warning in the section on trade libel: “You do not have the right to hold the product up
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[D]evelopment teams must be careful that they do not include assets in the
game that are trademarked or copyrighted—unless the legal rights are
obtained to do so. For example, Coca-Cola® vending machines and Crayola®
crayons cannot be used in games without contacting the companies that own
these properties and finalizing a contract to use these rights. 32
Another guide to video game law acknowledges that the First Amendment might
protect the use of trademarks in video games, but emphasizes the practical reality that
developers usually want “to avoid an unnecessary and expensive legal battle.”33 In any
medium, producers will sometimes (or even often) clear trademarks to avoid legal
problems, but established practices and disparate judicial treatment in the past likely
leave video game producers with a greater worry about provoking litigation.
Minimizing these worries requires a very clear rule about when creative uses of marks
will be protected. Only one version of the Rogers test represents a very clear rule and
that’s the original version.
III. FALSE ASSOCIATION/ENDORSEMENT
A basic purpose of the Lanham Act is to prevent consumer confusion about the
source or origin of goods, but the Act reaches further than just source confusion. It
also covers situations where the use of a mark is likely to cause confusion about the
“affiliation, connection, or association” between the owner of a mark and the producer
of a good,34 what are usually labeled false association or false endorsement claims.35
to ridicule or do anything that harms the reputation of the product.” MICHAEL C. DONALDSON,
CLEARANCE AND COPYRIGHT 183 (1996). The First Amendment consequences of such a broad rule
against tarnishment would be severe. They do mention possible dilution claims explicitly,
DONALDSON & CALLIF, supra note 30, at 313-17, but the dilution provisions of the Lanham Act do not
apply to non-commercial uses, which should block most of these types of claims where a mark is shown
within an expressive work. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C); Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902-07 (discussing the
meaning of “noncommercial” uses under the dilution provisions of the Lanham Act). Cf. American
Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Minn. 1998) (applying the dilution
provisions to the title of a film). However, from a practical standpoint—and they point this out—the
misuse of a real-world product may increase the likelihood that a trademark owner will object,
DONALDSON & CALLIF, supra note 30, at 313, and objections in the form of litigation are costly,
regardless of the merits. Perhaps they are actually blurring the doctrinal with the practical.
32 HEATHER MAXWELL CHANDLER, THE GAME PRODUCTION HANDBOOK 57 (3d ed. 2014).
33 THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S LEGAL GUIDE TO VIDEO GAME DEVELOPMENT 108 (Ross
Dannenberg ed., 2011).
34 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
35 See, e.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to the “so-called
‘false association’ prong of section 43 of the Lanham Act”); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093,
1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s
identity is a type of false association claim[.]”). The same claim might be labeled as a false designation
of origin claim, which is somewhat inaccurate when the confusion is about association rather than
who produces the good, but the courts ultimately treat these claims in the same way, regardless of the
label. See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000) (“A false designation
of origin claim brought by an entertainer under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act in a case such as this is
equivalent to a false association or endorsement claim . . . .”); Armstrong v. Eagle Rock Entm’t, Inc.,
655 F. Supp. 2d 779, 791 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (“Even though delineated as a ‘false designation of origin’
claim, Plaintiff seems to be arguing a ‘false endorsement’ claim.”). Claims brought under the
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These claims can involve the use of a mark in advertisements or on utilitarian
products36 and also the use of a mark in the title or body of an expressive work, such
as a book, film, or video game.37 The “mark” in question can even be the name,
likeness, or other indication of a real person, either living or dead. 38 In the present
context, the basic problem is this: when consumers recognize a real-world trademark
or a real person in a video game, they may think there is a licensing agreement between
the video game producer and the trademark owner or person depicted. And there may
indeed be a licensing agreement. After all, product placement deals are common. But
when there isn’t a licensing agreement, the trademark owner or the person depicted
may sue for false association. In an ordinary case of trademark infringement involving
competing products, a court will focus on whether the use of a mark is likely to cause
confusion using the traditional multi-factor test,39 but in a case involving the use of a
mark in an expressive work, a critical question is whether a defendant is entitled to a
First Amendment defense to avoid liability.
The lower federal courts have struggled to offer a consistent means for reconciling
the interests of Lanham Act plaintiffs with the First Amendment interests of
defendants who produce expressive works. Courts sometimes omit any discussion of
the First Amendment and simply consider whether an unlicensed use is likely to cause
confusion, doing the best they can to apply the traditional likelihood of confusion
factors in a false association context.40 The Appendix provides examples of the various
approaches. However, the dominant analysis in these cases comes from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi.41 The Rogers test applies only to expressive
infringement provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1114 may be treated as false association claims as well and
subject to the same First Amendment analysis. See American Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 732
(describing the claim brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 as at least involving confusion about whether
the defendant “received [an] endorsement or permission [from the plaintiff] for use of its mark”).
36 See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). The
court in Carson affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the use of the phrases “Here’s Johnny”
and “The World’s Foremost Commodian” in association with portable toilets was not likely to cause
confusion about Johnny Carson’s association with the product; however, the defendant’s use of the
mark was still within the scope of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 833-34.
37 See University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1277-79 (11th
Cir. 2012); E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n.11
(6th Cir. 2003).
38 See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1239 (“Although claims under § 43(a) generally relate to the use of
trademarks or trade dress to cause consumer confusion over affiliation or endorsement, we have held
that claims can also be brought under § 43(a) relating to the use of a public figure’s persona, likeness,
or other uniquely distinguishing characteristic to cause such confusion.”). For the deceased in
particular, see Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he fact of the celebrity’s death does not preclude a § 1125(a) claim.”); A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Estate of
Marilyn Monroe, 131 F.Supp.3d 196, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Preliminarily, this Court rejects the
Movants’ contention that there is a blanket prohibition against false endorsement claims involving
deceased celebrities.”).
39 See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing factors);
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (same). See also J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:28 (4th ed. 2017) (“The
Multi-factor tests of infringement”).
40 See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“This is
not a case where the Court can apply the traditional likelihood of confusion factors with any degree of
comfort.”).
41 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 31:144.50.
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works, not to advertisements.42 The test requires consideration of two questions: (1)
does the mark have “artistic relevance to the underlying work,” and if so, (2) is the use
“explicitly mislead[ing] as to the source or the content of the work[?]”43 The standard
for artistic relevance is very low.44 Only on occasion will a defendant stumble on the
first part of the Rogers test.45 It’s the second part of the test that causes more problems
because courts interpret this prong of the test in different ways, even within the same
circuit.
As a result of these variations, it’s plausible to speak of three Rogers tests, Rogers
I, Rogers II, and Rogers III.46 Rogers I is the original, the classic. It’s what is described
in the Rogers decision itself. Rogers I provides strong First Amendment protection, as
the Rogers defense cannot be overcome by a likelihood of confusion using the
traditional likelihood of confusion factors. Instead, the plaintiff must show that a
defendant explicitly misled consumers through some false statement of association. 47
The plaintiff must point to some “‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit
misstatement’” by the defendant.48
Rogers II, by contrast, provides moderate—or at least unpredictable—First
Amendment protection. This approach originated in two Second Circuit decisions
purporting to follow Rogers. One is Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, decided in 1989 just a few months after Rogers.49 The other is Twin
Peaks Productions. v. Publications International, Ltd., decided in 1993.50 Under this
approach, the court initially considers the traditional likelihood of confusion factors,
but then balances the extent of the confusion with the First Amendment according to
an ill-defined standard. Cliffs Notes calls for a court to give “proper weight” to the
“First Amendment considerations.”51 What counts as the “proper weight” is not very
clear. In Cliffs Notes, the Second Circuit found the First Amendment protected the
42 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. See also Brown, 724 F.3d at 1241 (“The Rogers test is reserved for
expressive works.”).
43 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
44 Id. See also E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1100 (“[T]he level of relevance merely must be above
zero.”).
45 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452-58 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the use of Rosa Parks’ name as the title for a song was
artistically relevant to the song).
46 The variations in the Rogers line of cases have been covered by others. Particularly relevant
to the present discussion, and one of the most detailed discussions of the topic, is Thomas M. Byron,
Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s View of the “Explicitly Misleading” Prong of the
Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (2011). See also Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking
the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1071-72 (2009). District
court judges trying to follow circuit precedent sometimes discuss the problem as well. See Stewart
Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Group, LLC, No. 10-2982, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155444, at *19-25
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011).
47 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (“We believe that in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression. In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name,
that balance will normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance
to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly
misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”).
48 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001).
49 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
50 996 F.2d at 1379.
51 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 n.3.
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defendant because there was “only a slight risk of consumer confusion.”52 Twin Peaks
says a plaintiff must make a “particularly compelling” showing of confusion.53 What
counts as “particularly compelling” was not resolved because the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to consider the question in the first instance.54
Either way, Rogers II calls for a vague balancing of interests, though one weighted in
favor of a media defendant.
Unlike Rogers I and II, Rogers III doesn’t even make sense. Under Rogers III,
what counts as explicitly misleading is no more than what is likely to cause confusion.
The Ninth Circuit’s 2008 decision in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc.,55 is the source of the problem. In E.S.S. Entertainment, the court
considered what was essentially a false association claim made by the owner of the
Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club against Rockstar Games, Inc., the producer of Grand Theft
Auto: San Andreas.56 The game includes a strip club called the Pig Pen inspired by
and sharing some similarities with the plaintiff’s real-world Play Pen club.57 The
district court granted Rockstar summary judgment based on its First Amendment
defense and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 58
The court of appeals’ discussion of the Rogers test, is the issue, not the outcome.
The Ninth Circuit had adopted the Rogers test in an earlier decision, one that seems
fairly characterized as a Rogers I case. In that earlier case, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records,59 the court held that the First Amendment protected the defendants’ use of
the term “Barbie” in the song “Barbie Girl” against claims brought by Mattel, the
maker of the Barbie line of dolls. 60 The court did not consider whether there was a
likelihood of confusion, but only whether the use of the mark was explicitly
misleading.61
In applying the Rogers test in E.S.S. Entertainment, the Ninth Circuit had little
trouble concluding the strip club was artistically relevant to Grand Theft Auto: San

Id. at 497.
Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379 (“The question then is whether the title is misleading in the
sense that it induces members of the public to believe the Book was prepared or otherwise authorized
by [the plaintiff]. This determination must be made, in the first instance, by application of the
venerable Polaroid factors. However, the finding of likelihood of confusion must be particularly
compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interest recognized in Rogers.”) (internal citation
omitted).
54 Id.
55 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). The defendant was actually Rock Star Games, Inc., but the
plaintiff made a mistake in the original complaint. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos,
Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting the mistake), aff’d, E.S.S. Entm’t, 547
F.3d at 1101.
56 The complaint labels the relevant claim “Federal Trade Dress Infringement and Unfair
Competition [Lanham Act 15 U.S.C., § 1125(a)]” and includes four additional and largely duplicative
state law claims. See Complaint at 1, E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., No. 05-2966
(C.D. Cal. April 28, 2005) (listing claims) (bracketed material in original); E.S.S. Entm’t, 444 F. Supp.
2d at 1049 (noting that “[t]he legal framework used to analyze these [state law] claims is substantially
the same as the framework used to evaluate Lanham Act claims under federal law”).
57 See E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1097-98.
58 Id. at 1098.
59 See Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
60 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
61 See id.
52
53
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Andreas. The Play Pen is an East Los Angeles strip club.62 The game includes a
“cartoon-style parody” of East Los Angeles.63 Clearly, the strip club is relevant to the
game. But is the appearance of a similar club in the game explicitly misleading? In
reframing this inquiry, the court said, “The relevant question, therefore, is whether
the Game would confuse its players into thinking that the Play Pen is somehow behind
the Pig Pen or that it sponsors Rockstar’s product.”64 Under Rogers I, this is not at all
the relevant question. The relevant question is whether the use was explicitly
misleading, not whether consumers are likely to be confused.
Is E.S.S. Entertainment a Rogers II case, one that requires the plaintiff to make
some heightened showing of confusion? The Ninth Circuit’s entire analysis consisted
of a discussion of why confusion was unlikely, though it wasn’t even the right sort of
confusion. The court said no one would think E.S.S. produced the game or provided
any strip club expertise to Rockstar, but there is no indication E.S.S. made either
argument. E.S.S. instead argued in its brief that the use of its marks communicated
to consumers that E.S.S. endorsed the game, not that E.S.S. produced the game or
designed the virtual strip club.65 During the oral argument, E.S.S. repeatedly referred
to the game implying sponsorship or association, not confusion about origin.66
Regardless, is E.S.S. Entertainment a Rogers II case? Maybe, but at no point did the
court say E.S.S. would need to make a heightened showing of confusion.
What about Rogers III then, where “explicitly misleading” simply means likely to
cause confusion? A lack of any special First Amendment protection in these false
association cases would not be unheard of. Various decisions have suggested that the
likelihood of confusion test is itself enough to prevent First Amendment problems. 67
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit implied it would not interpret the Rogers test to
reduce the First Amendment to no defense at all. 68 The plaintiff always has the burden
to show a likelihood of confusion in an infringement case brought under the Lanham
Act.69 Without a likelihood of confusion, there is no need for a defense, Rogers or
otherwise. If the E.S.S. Entertainment decision does equate the term “explicitly
misleading” with “a likelihood of confusion,” then the Rogers test would be
meaningless, and the First Amendment would indeed be no defense at all. So, which
See id.
See E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1100.
64 Id.
65 See Opening Br. of Appellant at 24, E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., No. 0656237 (9th Cir. March 9, 2007) (“The wholesale utilization of E.S.S.’s trademarks and trade dress and
the prominence given to the club which they identify sends a clear message of endorsement by the
owner of that intellectual property.”); id. at 37 (stating that “the claim of infringement is based not on
competition between the parties but on the creation of an unauthorized implication of endorsement,
sponsorship or other association.”).
66 Oral Argument at 00:03:45, E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., No. 06-56237
(9th Cir. March 5, 2008).
67 See Parks, 329 F.3d at 447-48.
68 See E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099 (“[A] trademark infringement claim presupposes a use of
the mark. If that necessary element in every trademark case vitiated a First Amendment defense,
the First Amendment would provide no defense at all.”).
69 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117-21 (2004);
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]s the Supreme
Court has unambiguously instructed, the Lanham Act always places the ‘burden of proving likelihood
of confusion . . . on the party charging infringement.’”) (quoting KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at
118).
62
63
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is it, Rogers II or Rogers III? As one district court judge said in reviewing these cases,
“The Ninth Circuit has not made its approach clear.” 70 The upshot of E.S.S
Entertainment was that district courts in the Ninth Circuit had the flexibility to put
whatever weight on the First Amendment they chose. Two district court decisions
following E.S.S. Entertainment involving video games provide examples, one a Rogers
III case from 2012 and the other a Rogers I case from 2013.
In 2012, the Northern District of California applied the Rogers III test in
Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Textron, Inc.71 Electronic Arts produced the Battlefield 3 video
game and used the trademarks and trade dress in the game for three military
helicopters owned by Textron Innovations and produced by Bell Helicopter Textron
Inc. EA did not ask for permission to use these helicopters in the game, and Textron
accused EA of infringement.72 The parties had a history of litigating this issue in
another court involving other games.73 This time, EA filed for a declaratory judgment
of non-infringement.74 Textron responded with multiple counterclaims, the bottom
line of which was a claim of false association. EA argued the court should apply the
Rogers test and dismiss these claims rather than consider whether confusion was
likely.75 The district court responded to EA’s motion to dismiss as follows:
Our court of appeals in E.S.S. . . . looked at “whether the Game would confuse
its players into thinking that the Play Pen is somehow behind the Pig Pen or
that it sponsors Rockstar’s product” when it evaluated the second prong of
the Rogers test. Our court of appeals considered that the strip club was
“incidental” to the game; consumers would not “reasonably have believed that
ESS produced the video game;” it was “far-fetched that someone playing [the
game] would think ESS had provided whatever expertise, support, or unique
strip-club knowledge it possesses to the game;” and “the chance to attend a
virtual strip club is unambiguously not the main selling point of the Game.”
In contrast, here, it is plausible that consumers could think Textron provided
expertise and knowledge to the game in order to create its realistic simulation
of the actual workings of the Bell-manufactured helicopters. Textron alleges
that its helicopters are “given particular prominence” as opposed to being
70 Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Group, LLC, No. 10-2982, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155444, at *23 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011).
71 See Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., No. 12-0118, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103914 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2012).
72 Id. at *3.
73 Id. at *2-3. See generally Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Complaint, Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc. v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 06-0841 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2007). In commenting on this earlier
litigation back in 2010, I speculated that the case would have come out favorably to Electronic Arts in
the courts in the Ninth Circuit, based on the ruling in E.S.S. Entertainment. See William K. Ford &
Ben D. Manevitz, Implications of Video Games and Virtual Worlds in Trademark Law 145, 181, in
COMPUTER GAMES AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Ross A. Dannenberg, Steve Mortinger, Roxanne Christ,
Chrissie Scelsi & Farnaz Alemi eds., 2010). Given the outcome in the later Textron case in the
Northern District of California, the prediction looks wrong (though cases like Novalogic suggest it
would have come down to the assigned judge). At the time, I did not read E.S.S. Entertainment as
endorsing the Rogers III approach. Again, this approach makes no sense, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text, but the 2012 Textron decision makes clear the confusion that can arise from E.S.S.
Entertainment.
74 Elec. Arts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103914, at *2-3.
75 Id. at *11.
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merely “incidental,” and the ability to control vehicles such as the helicopters
in question is a major reason for the game’s success; therefore, consumers
could plausibly think Textron sponsored the game. Although consumers are
unlikely to think Textron has entered the video-game business, Textron has
alleged sufficient facts to support the inference that the game explicitly leads
consumers to believe it is “somehow behind” or “sponsors” Battlefield 3.76
In other words, the court thought the use of the marks might be explicitly misleading.
Why? Because it’s plausible that consumers are confused about the association
between the parties, particularly because of the prominent use of the marks.
Prominence was not considered a problem in cases like Mattel, where the Barbie mark
was part of the song title and song lyrics, but Mattel was a Rogers I case. Textron is a
Rogers III case, and Rogers III requires no more than asking whether consumers are
likely to be confused, and consumers probably do think licensing is the norm in the
video game industry, absent a parody or some obvious modifications to the mark.77
In 2013, by contrast, the Central District of California followed E.S.S.
Entertainment in Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard,78 but this time, the district
court applied Rogers I. Novalogic owns registered trademarks in both the text DELTA
FORCE and in the design of a Delta Force Logo, both for use with computer and video
games.79 Activision used the term “Delta Force” and a similar logo in Call of Duty:
Modern Warfare 3 video game. Penguin Group (USA) Inc. published the official
strategy guide, which also used these marks. 80 Novalogic sued. In response to a motion
for summary judgment by Activision and Penguin, the court, citing Mattel and E.S.S.
Entertainment, applied the Rogers test and held that these uses are protected by the
First Amendment.
The court started its analysis with the general observation that the Rogers test is
“very protective of speech.”81 In applying the two-part Rogers test, the court said the
use of the marks “easily” satisfies the artistic relevance prong, largely because the
marks contribute to the realism of the game due to the real-world existence of an elite
Delta Force unit in the United States Army.82 As for whether the uses were explicitly
misleading, the court quoted a district court decision from the Southern District of
Indiana calling for more than a likelihood of confusion: “To be ‘explicitly misleading,’
a defendant’s work must make some affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s
Id. at *11-12 (internal citations omitted).
Textron itself made this argument in the case: “Consumers of these games expect that the
intellectual property of a party is used with the permission and approval of the mark’s owner,
particularly when a purpose of the game is to realistically simulate the use of a product associated
with the mark.” Elec. Arts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103914, at *10.
78 41 F. Supp. 3d 885 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In the present discussion, Activision refers to both
Activision Blizzard, Inc. and Activision Publishing, Inc. See id. at 889 n.1.
79 Id. at 889. See DELTA FORCE, Registration No. 2,302,869; Registration No. 2,704,298.
80 See Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 892-93. See also MICHAEL OWEN ET AL., CALL OF DUTY: MW3
OFFICIAL STRATEGY GUIDE (2011). The description in the strategy guide of the “Black Tuesday
Mission,” for example, uses both the term “Delta Force” and Activision’s version of the disputed logo.
See id. at 8. Another issue in the case involved the use of the Delta Force logo on headphones
manufactured by Turtle Beach, but this issue was not resolved in the summary judgment motion
presently under discussion. See Novalogic, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 893.
81 Id. at 900.
82 Id.
76
77
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sponsorship or endorsement, beyond the mere use of the plaintiff’s name or other
characteristic.”83 Novalogic was unable to provide any convincing evidence that
Activision made such a statement.84 The court went further and said that even if some
consumers were confused, it would not matter because the confusion would not be due
to an explicitly misleading statement by Activision.85
Just a few weeks after the district court decided Novalogic, the Ninth Circuit
decided another case in the Rogers line, but this time, the court offered the most
unmistakable endorsement yet of the Rogers I approach, an apparent vindication of
Novalogic over Textron. In Brown v. Electronic Arts,86 the Ninth Circuit considered a
claim by retired football great Jim Brown that EA violated the Lanham Act by using
his likeness in the Madden NFL football games without permission. 87
The Ninth Circuit described the Brown case as similar to E.S.S.,88 but it described
the Rogers test in very different terms. As far as artistic relevance, there is no
difference between E.S.S. Entertainment and Brown. The standard is low and as
should be expected, the court viewed Brown’s likeness as artistically relevant to a game
that simulates professional football. 89 With regard to what qualifies as explicitly
misleading, however, Brown is clearly a Rogers I decision.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s Lanham Act claim, the Ninth
Circuit held that the First Amendment protected EA’s use of Brown’s likeness.90 EA
did not explicitly mislead consumers about his involvement with the game, even
italicizing the word “explicitly” for emphasis more than once.91 For Brown to prevail,
he needed to identity some “‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit
misstatement’” by EA.92 Brown offered no (timely) examples of statements to
consumers generally.93 The court dismissed the relevance of any evidence of consumer
confusion not tied to some explicit statement by Electronic Arts. 94 The fact that
consumers may typically think marks are used in video games with licenses is also
irrelevant.95 No matter how many consumers are confused, EA’s use is still protected,
83 Id. at 901 (quoting Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 09-1236, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006,
at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011)).
84 Id. at 903.
85 Id. at 902-03 (“[E]ven assuming that some consumers might have mistakenly believe [sic] that
some relationship exists between Activision and Plaintiff as a result of the use of the phrase ‘Delta
Force’ and the MW3 Delta Force Logo in MW3, that mistaken belief on the part of those consumers
would still not satisfy the second prong of the Rogers test.”).
86 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
87 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1238-40.
88 Id. at 1242-43.
89 Id. at 1243 (“[I]t is obvious that Brown’s likeness has at least some artistic relevance to EA’s
work.”).
90 Id. at 1239, 1248.
91 Id. at 1245, 1246.
92 Id. at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001).
93 Brown pointed to statements on the packaging of two versions of Madden NFL that said,
‘Officially Licensed Product of NFL PLAYERS,” but the court did not consider this argument because
it was not raised in Brown’s opening brief. Id. at 1247 n.6.
94 Id. at 1245 (“Adding survey evidence changes nothing.”). See also Twentieth Century Fox TV
v. Empire Distrib., 161 F. Supp. 3d 902, 909 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“[I]t is clear that no amount of evidence
showing only consumer confusion can satisfy the ‘explicitly misleading’ prong of the Rogers test
because such evidence goes only to the ‘impact of the use’ on a consumer.”).
95 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248.
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absent an explicitly misleading statement by EA, and the court rejected any attempt
to blur the line between what is explicitly misleading and what may inadvertently
cause confusion.
The unusual clarity of the Brown decision may prevent future district courts or
even appellate panels in the Ninth Circuit from backsliding into a Rogers II or III
approach. Two subsequent video game cases provide some confirmation of Brown’s
endurance.96 The first is the 2014 decision by the Northern District of California in
Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.97 Mil-Spec Monkey (“MSM”) sued
Activision for including a digital version of MSM’s “angry monkey” morale patch in
Call of Duty: Ghosts.98 A morale patch is a patch worn on non-official clothing by
members of the military.99 MSM’s patch, as well as many other patches, can be added
to highly customizable player avatars in Call of Duty: Ghosts.100 MSM sued Activision
claiming copyright infringement and several other claims all amounting to false
association claims.101 The district court, following Brown, found the patch artistically
relevant to a realistic military-themed game and further found nothing explicitly
misleading in Activision’s use, as there was no evidence that Activision “affirmatively”
misled consumers about its relationship with MSM. 102 The court therefore dismissed
MSM’s Lanham Act claims and its related state law claims. 103
The second case is also a decision by the Northern District of California, the 2015
decision in Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC.104 The
plaintiffs were Virag, an Italian company that sells commercial flooring, and Marco
Virag, one of the company’s owners and a professional race car driver. 105 Virag
sponsors the Rally of Monza at a racetrack in Italy, and Virag’s mark appears on a
bridge over the track.106 This racetrack appears in two Sony video games, Gran
Turismo 5 and Gran Turismo 6, and Virag’s mark appears on a bridge in the games.107
Virag did not authorize this use of the mark.108 In part, Virag sued for a violation of
the Lanham Act.109 In response to Sony’s motion to dismiss, the district court applied
the Rogers test, specifically, Rogers I.110 As usual, the court found the mark was
artistically relevant to the games, mainly because the mark appears at the real-world

96 An example of a non-video game case is Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distrib., 161 F.
Supp. 3d 902 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
97 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014). As before, “Activision” refers to both Activision Blizzard,
Inc. and Activision Publishing, Inc. See id. at 1136.
98 Id. at 1136.
99 Id. at 1136-37.
100 Id. at 1138.
101 Id. at 1136.
102 Id. at 1143.
103 Mil-Spec Monkey, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
104 No. 15-1729, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111211 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
105 Id. at *3-4.
106 Id. at *2.
107 Id. at *5-8.
108 Id. at *8; Answer to First Amended Complaint by Defendants Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC
and Sony Comput. Entm’t Inc. at ¶ 32, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 15-1729
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2015) (“Sony admits that it did not obtain a license or authorization directly from
Virag or Mirco Virag.”).
109 Virag, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111211, at *2.
110 Id. at *27.

[16:306 2017] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

322

racetrack depicted in the games, and Sony’s games emphasize realism.111 As for the
second prong, the court followed Brown, looked for an explicitly misleading statement
of association and found none: “The plaintiffs do not allege or even suggest that the
defendants explicitly indicated, claimed, or misstated that VIRAG was a source of
content for Gran Turismo 5 or Gran Turismo 6 or sponsored Gran Turismo 5 or Gran
Turismo 6.”112 Virag argued consumers might assume its involvement with the game
because of the company’s activities in European racing, but under Brown, that is not
enough.113 The court therefore granted Sony’s motion to dismiss Virag’s Lanham Act
claims.114
Virag does contain a wrinkle. Unsurprisingly, Virag argued the court should
follow the Textron decision.115 The district court distinguished Textron partly because
it was decided before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown, which should have been
the end of the discussion. But the court also distinguished Textron because “in addition
to alleging that the [EA] used [Textron’s] marks and trade dress, [Textron] alleged that
the helicopters were a main selling point for the game and [EA] intended consumer
confusion.”116 In Textron, the prominence of the marks appeared to be the only
evidence of EA’s intent to deceive customers, but as already noted, the prominence of
the use of a mark should not, by itself, be enough to show a use is explicitly misleading,
given not only the Mattel “Barbie Girl” case, but also the original Rogers decision.
What’s notable about Virag is that while the court thought the use of the marks
in the racetrack was distinguishable from the use of the marks in Textron, the district
court suggested that more prominent uses could change the outcome under the Rogers
analysis. In Virag, this language is dicta, but it suggests some slippage from the
certainty offered by Brown’s take on the Rogers test. As mentioned earlier, Virag is
currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Although Virag does not rely exclusively
on its interpretation of the second prong of the Rogers test for its appeal, Virag does
argue at length that Textron was sound.117 On its own, this argument might not be
that important, but in light of the district court’s suggestion that Textron might still
be persuasive, the need for the Ninth Circuit to respond is clear. So long as the Ninth
Circuit continues to follows its prior decision in Brown, Virag should be game over for
Textron, Rogers II, and Rogers III, but the court needs to explicitly disapprove of
Textron to ensure its persuasive value comes to an end.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the results in these false association cases are often the same—victory for
the media defendant—the inconsistency in the approaches works against creative
Id. at *33-37
Id. at *38 (italics added).
113 Id. at *38-39.
114 Id. at *40-41,
115 Virag, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111211, at *39; Transcript of Official Electronic Sound
Recording of Proceedings at 11–14, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 15-1729 (N.D.
Cal. July 30, 2015) (arguing for the relevance and persuasiveness of Textron).
116 Virag, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111211, at *40.
117 Br. of Appellant at 55-60, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 16-15137 (9th
Cir. June 2, 2016).
111
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freedom. As noted in one of the attempts to persuade the Supreme Court to address
the tension between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, the “lack of
uniformity profoundly endangers free speech.”118 The frequent statements in false
association cases that a plaintiff can prevail by showing an ordinary or even a
heightened likelihood of confusion invite more litigation. The regularity of these types
of lawsuits suggests that even more or less consistent outcomes are not enough to deter
litigation. Clear rules may help.
The original Rogers decision represents a clear rule, but it is undermined by the
frequent departures from it. For trademarks owners, these departures are beneficial.
They promote uncertainty, uncertainty increases risk, and risk leads to defensive
licensing, which restricts creative freedom. Creative freedom should not harm
consumers, as consumers are unlikely to make video game purchasing decisions based
on whether, say, Coke or Pepsi makes an appearance in a game, any more than a
product placement choice would affect whether consumers see a film. While the
appearance of military equipment in a military game is quite another matter—this
sort of thing is important to consumers who want a realistic game—consumers are
unlikely to care whether a defense manufacturer officially approves of the appearance
of its equipment in a game, any more than a consumer would care whether Textron or
Bell Helicopter officially approve of the appearance of their helicopters in Apocalypse
Now119 or some other film.120 Textron and Bell Helicopter have expertise in military
equipment, not in video game or film evaluation.
Like Rogers, the Ninth Circuit’s Brown decision offered a clear rule, perhaps even
clearer in its description than Rogers itself, but the district court’s decision in Virag
hints at a setback. The Ninth Circuit can correct this setback in the Virag appeal, but
whatever happens in the Ninth Circuit, the lack of uniformity will remain in other
circuits and will likely continue as a greater deterrent to free expression in the video
game industry than to other forms of media. The time is long overdue for the U.S.
Supreme Court to address the issue.

118 Br. of 31 Constitutional Law Professors and Intellectual Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Davis, No. 15-424 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015), cert. denied,
136 S.Ct. 1448 (2016).
119 Apocalypse Now (United Artists 1979).
120 Under Textron, a filmmaker couldn’t make a modern military movie without clearance from
defense contractors, assuming the court treated filmmakers in the same way as video game producers.
The same problem was posed by the earlier litigation between the parties involving Vietnam era
games. See Ford & Manevitz, supra note 73, at 179-80 (“The Huey [helicopter] is among the standard
imagery included in Vietnam movies, television shows, and games, meaning the plaintiffs were
asserting a right to control an essential element for the creation of expressive works about the
Vietnam War—an element that is not even an ordinary consumer product.”).
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Appendix
Examples of False Association Cases Involving Expressive Works 121

Year

Media Defendant
Prevailed on TM
Claims?

Media
Type

2016

Yes

films

Outcome

Analytical
Approach

Case

Facts

Dryer v. NFL, 814 F.3d
938 (8th Cir. 2016)

plaintiff-appellants,
three retired football
players, sued the NFL
because NFL Films
reused old football game
footage in which they
appeared in newer
historical films

affirmed grant of
defendant’s motion for
summary judgment

Twentieth Century Fox
TV v. Empire Distrib.,
161 F. Supp. 3d 902
(C.D. Cal. 2016)

plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment
that their use of the word
“empire” in the title of
their TV series Empire
did not infringe on the
rights of defendant
record label Empire
Distribution

granted declaratory
judgment plaintiffs’
motion for summary
judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

misleading or false
statement test
Note: The court’s
approach is closest to
Rogers I, but the court
did not cite Rogers.

2016

Yes

TV show

2015

Yes

video game

Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony
Comput. Entm’t Am.
LLC, No. 15-1729, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111211 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
21, 2015)

plaintiffs sued the
defendants for the
unauthorized use of the
VIRAG mark on a
bridge over a racetrack
in two Sony racing video
games, Gran Turismo 5
and Gran Turismo 6

granted defendants’
motion to dismiss the
Lanham Act claims

Rogers test (Rogers I)

2014

Yes

video game

Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc.
v. Activision Blizzard,
Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d
1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014)

plaintiff seller of
unofficial military
patches sued the
defendants for making
its “angry monkey”
patch available for
players’ uniforms in
Call of Duty: Ghosts

granted defendants’
motion for partial
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

2013

Yes

video game

Brown v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th
Cir. 2013)

plaintiff football Hall of
Famer Jim Brown sued
the defendant over the
use of his likeness in the
Madden NFL video
game series

affirmed grant of
defendant’s motion to
dismiss

Rogers test (Rogers I)

121

This list is not exhaustive.

[16:306 2017]

Restoring Rogers

325

Year

Media Defendant
Prevailed on TM
Claims?

Media
Type

2013

Yes

video game

Novalogic, Inc. v.
Activision Blizzard, 41
F. Supp. 3d 885 (C.D.
Cal. 2013)

plaintiff publisher of
video games sued the
defendants over the use
of plaintiff’s Delta Force
marks within the game
Call of Duty 3: Modern
Warfare, the related
strategy guide, and a set
of headphones, with
only the first two uses at
issue in the present
decision

granted defendants’
motion for partial
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

2012

No

video game

Elec. Arts, Inc. v.
Textron Inc., No. 120118, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103914 (N.D.
Cal. July 25, 2012)

plaintiff Electronic Arts
sought a declaratory
judgment that it did not
infringe the defendants’
trademarks by including
the defendants’
helicopters in the video
game Battlefield 3; the
defendants filed
trademark infringement
counterclaims

denied plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss the
defendants’
counterclaims

Rogers test (Rogers III)

2011

Yes

video game

Dillinger, LLC v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., No. 09-1236,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64006 (S.D. Ind. June
16, 2011)

plaintiff owner of the
rights to John Dillinger’s
name sued Electronic
Arts for naming a
weapon after Dillinger
in The Godfather (2006)
and The Godfather II
(2009) video games

granted defendant’s
motion for summary
judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

2011

Yes

book

Stewart Surfboards, Inc.
v. Disney Book Group,
LLC, No. 10-2982, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155444 (C.D. Cal. May
11, 2011)

plaintiffs sued Disney
for the appearance of the
plaintiffs’ Stewart
Surfboards trademark on
a surfboard shown on
the back cover of a book
called Hannah Montana:
Rock the Waves

granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss

Rogers test (Rogers I)

2009

Yes

pornographic
film

Roxbury Entm’t v.
Penthouse Media
Group, Inc., 669 F.
Supp. 2d 1170 (C.D.
Cal. 2009)

plaintiff owner of the
“Route 66” television
program sued the
defendants over the title
of a pornographic film
called Route 66
(according to plaintiff)
or Penthouse: Route 66
(according to
defendants)

granted defendants’
motion for summary
judgment

Rogers test (Rogers III)

2008

Yes

video game

E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc.
v. Rock Star Videos,
Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th
Cir. 2008)

plaintiff owner of the
“Play Pen” strip club
sued defendants over the
use of the “Pig Pen”
strip club in Grand Theft
Auto: San Andreas

affirmed the grant of
defendant’s motion for
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers II,
III?)

Case

Facts

Outcome

Analytical
Approach
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Media Defendant
Prevailed on TM
Claims?

Media
Type

2008

No

2007

2007
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Outcome

Analytical
Approach

Case

Facts

video game

Ultimate Creations, Inc.
v. THQ Inc., No. 061134, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8224 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 24, 2008)

plaintiff, the licensing
agent of the professional
wrestler originally
named the Ultimate
Warrior and later just
Warrior, sued the
defendant over the
ability to create
wrestlers similar to the
Warrior in its assorted
wrestling video games

denied the defendant’s
motion for summary
judgment

likelihood of confusion
test

No

video game

Bell Helicopter Textron
Inc. v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
No. 06-0841 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 6, 2007) (order)

plaintiffs Bell Helicopter
Textron and Textron
Innovations sued the
defendant over the use
of their helicopters in the
defendant’s Battlefield
Vietnam, Battlefield
Vietnam: Redux, and
Battlefield 2 video
games

denied defendant’s
motion to dismiss

no rationale given

Yes

TV show

Burnett v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.,
491 F. Supp. 2d 962
(C.D. Cal. 2007)

plaintiff Carol Burnett
sued the defendant over
verbal references to her
and the depiction of her
“Charwoman” character
from the Carol Burnett
Show in an episode of
Family Guy

granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss

likelihood of confusion
test

Davis v. Walt Disney
Co., 430 F.3d 901 (8th
Cir. 2005)

plaintiffs Earth Protector
Licensing Corporation
and Earth Protector, Inc.
sued the defendants over
the use of a fictional
company called Earth
Protectors in a film
called Up, Up and Away

affirmed grant of
defendants’ motion for
summary judgment

likelihood of confusion
test

+ vague references to
the Rogers First
Amendment test

2005

Yes

film

2003

Yes

photographs

Mattel Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)

plaintiff Mattel sued the
defendants over the
defendant’s
photographs, most of
which depicted “a nude
Barbie in danger of
being attacked by
vintage household
appliances”

affirmed grant of
defendant’s motion for
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I?)

2003

Yes

film

Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill.
2003)

plaintiff Caterpillar sued
the defendant for the use
of Caterpillar bulldozers
(with visible Caterpillar
marks) in the film
George of the Jungle 2

denied plaintiff’s
motion for a TRO

likelihood of confusion
test
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Year

Media Defendant
Prevailed on TM
Claims?

Media
Type

2003

Yes

film

Wham-O, Inc. v.
Paramount Pictures
Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d
1254 (N.D. Ill. 2003)

plaintiff toymaker sued
the defendants over the
use of the Slip ‘N Slide
in the film Dickie
Roberts: Former Child
Star

denied plaintiff’s
motion for a TRO

likelihood of confusion
test

2003

Yes

painting

ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915 (6th Cir. 2003)

plaintiff, the licensing
agent for Tiger Woods,
sued the defendant over
his painting “The
Masters of Augusta,” a
depiction of Wood’s
1997 victory at the
Masters Tournament in
Augusta, Georgia

affirmed grant of
defendant’s motion for
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

2002

Yes

song

Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, 296 F.3d 894
(9th Cir. 2002)

plaintiff Mattel sued the
defendants over the
reference to Barbie in
defendants’ song
“Barbie Girl”

affirmed grant of
defendants’ motion for
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

1998

No

film

American Dairy Queen
Corp. v. New Line
Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d
727 (D. Minn. 1998)

plaintiff restaurateur
Dairy Queen sued the
producer of a
mockumentary about
beauty contests in rural
Minnesota entitled
“Dairy Queens”

granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting
defendant from using
the title “Dairy Queens”

likelihood of confusion
test where adequate
alternative avenues of
communication exist,
plus a dash of Rogers
(Rogers II?)

Case

Facts

Outcome

Analytical
Approach

Note: The court also
held that the title of the
film was a commercial
use of a mark and that
the plaintiff’s dilution
claim was likely to
succeed.
1998

1994

No

No

film

magazine

Films of Distinction v.
Allegro Film Prods.,
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d
1068 (C.D. Cal. 1998)

plaintiff owner of “The
Crime Channel”
television network sued
the defendants over the
use of a “Crime
Channel” television
station in the plot for the
film Relative Fear

denied defendants’
motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s Lanham Act
claims

likelihood of confusion
test

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ’ns, 28
F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994)

plaintiff brewer of
Michelob beers sued the
defendants over a
parody advertisement for
“Michelob Oily” on the
back page of Snicker
magazine

reversed the district
court’s dismissal and
directed judgment for
the plaintiff

Rogers test (Rogers II?)

Note: The district court
predicted the Ninth
Circuit would not adopt
the Second Circuit’s
Rogers test (which the
court described as
Rogers II).
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Year

Media Defendant
Prevailed on TM
Claims?

Media
Type

1993

Mixed

book

Twin Peaks Prods. v.
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996
F.2d 1366 (2d Cir.
1993)

plaintiff producer of the
television program
“Twin Peaks” sued the
publisher of a book
about “Twin Peaks”
called Welcome to Twin
Peaks: A Complete
Guide to Who’s Who
and What’s What

vacated the district
court’s grant of
plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment on
trademark liability

Rogers test (Rogers II)

1989

Yes

film

Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)

plaintiff Ginger Rogers
sued the defendants over
the reference to her in
the title of the film
Ginger and Fred

affirmed grant of
defendants’ motion for
summary judgment

Rogers test (Rogers I)

plaintiff Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders sued the
defendants over the use
of a uniform “strikingly
similar” to the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders
uniform in the
advertisements for the
film Debbie Does Dallas
and in the film itself,
including references to
the star as an “Ex Dallas
Cowgirl Cheerleader”

affirmed granted
plaintiff a preliminary
injunction

likelihood of confusion
test where adequate
alternative avenues of
communication exist

1979

No

pornographic
film

Case

Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979)

Facts

Outcome

Analytical
Approach

Note: The Second
Circuit distinguished
Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders by
claiming it “involved a
pornographic movie
with blatantly false
advertising.”

Note: This case is
plausibly seen as
primarily about dilution
by tarnishment in the
special context of
pornography.

